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Think Again: Supplying War 
Reappraising Military Logistics and its Centrality to Strategy and War 
Mark Erbel & Christopher Kinsey 
[This is the Accepted Manuscript. A proofed version of this manuscript has been published 
in the Journal of Strategic Studies, advance online publication (11 December 2015) available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2015.1104669] 
Academic debate in security and strategic studies over the past two decades has focused 
overwhelmingly on understanding changes to the security environment and their impact 
on the strategy and conduct of contemporary wars. Nowhere is this more obvious than 
with the wars fought by Western armies following the attacks of 11 September 2001 
(9/11). Discussions between academics covered even the most detailed (grand) strategic, 
operational, and tactical aspects of contemporary war, from the very general to the very 
specific levels; all but one. 
The supply of military operations since the end of the Cold War is virtually absent from 
these debates, despite the central relevance of military logistics for every aspect of 
military operations, including and particularly for strategy.1 In effect, the academic 
literature routinely ignores a pivotal component of war which, on the one hand, is the 
arbiter of strategic opportunity,2 and which, on the other hand, is heavily determined by 
strategic and operational planning. The only area of the supply of war that receives 
substantial attention is the development of weapon systems and technology in the 
context of the defence industrial base.3 Yet even here, the focus is on the Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA) and the modernisation and globalisation of the defence industry, 
                                                 
1 See Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986) for a seminal historical survey of the importance of logistics in major 
wars. See also Julian Thompson, The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict (London: Brassey’s, 
1991). 
 See Thomas M. Kane, Military Logistics and Strategic Performance (London: Frank Cass, 2001) for 
the linkage between military logistics and strategic performance. 
2 Kane, Military Logistics, 10. 
3 See Jacques S. Gansler, Democracy’s Arsenal: Creating a Twenty-First-Century Defense Industry 
(London: MIT Press, 2011), Eugene Gholz, ‘Globalization, Systems Integration, and the Future 
of Great Power War,’ Security Studies 16, no. 4 (October-December 2007): 615-636, Eugene 
Gholz and Harvey M. Sapolsky, ‘Restructuring the US Defense Industry,’ International Security 24, 
no. 3 (Winter 1999/2000): 5-51, and Stephen G. Brook, Producing Security: Multinational 
Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2005). 
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while the Revolution in Military Logistics (RML) – a prerequisite for the RMA –4 has 
been mostly disregarded. The same applies to the question of who does military logistics 
today and how. Little thought has been given to the increasing complexity and 
diversification of the military supply chain and logistics systems, or the service industry 
which now provides most non-combat services to numerous armies.5  
This article takes on the near-absence of logistics in post-Cold War security and strategic 
studies. It departs from the understanding that logistics constrains strategic opportunity 
while itself being heavily circumscribed by strategic and operational planning, 
emphasising the deep reciprocity of their relationship. We contend that academic debate 
must pay attention to both, the more abstract strategic level of war as well as the sources 
and supply of its implementation. Otherwise, it will remain incomplete and unable to 
fully comprehend the conduct and outcome of war, as well as military effectiveness. To 
make this case, the paper builds on two observations of the evolution of military 
logistics, the international security environment, and war since the end of the Cold War. 
First, military logistics – broadly defined – has evolved significantly over the past 
decades. In particular, the revolutions in military affairs and logistics, the increased 
outsourcing of logistics functions, and the accelerated transfer of assets and knowledge 
out of the military and into the private sector, have resulted not only in technological 
advances, but also in less visible and controllable layers and actors in the supply chains 
through which strategies are supported and realised. 
Secondly, while this alone should warrant a reappraisal of logistics’ relationship with 
strategy, various developments at the strategic level likewise affect the contemporary 
character of the logistics-strategy nexus, further bolstering our case. These are the 
change in military orientation away from (mostly known) conventional threats and 
adversaries during the Cold War towards risks and (often unknown) adversaries today. 
This becomes especially evident in the complex operational environments which 
Western armies have been most deeply involved in since the end of the Cold War. The 
potential for mistakes or shortages snowballing into substantial problems is 
considerable. For instance, a strategic miscalculation may lead to insufficient support 
provisions making strategic objectives unattainable, or a complex logistical system may 
inadvertently directly affect the ill-defined battle space. 
                                                 
4 Dennis J. Reimer, ‘The Revolution in Military Logistics’, Army Logistician 31, no. 1 (1999): 2. 
5 Instead, the academic debate on privatization focuses almost exclusively on security companies. 
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While the literature addresses both developments in isolation of one another, what has 
remained wanting is a reappraisal of the logistics-strategy nexus and how the 
developments outlined above influence its current shape. It is this reappraisal which this 
paper will undertake. On a general level, it will establish the reciprocal links between 
logistics and logistical constraints on the one hand and strategic planning and 
performance on the other. On a more specific level, it will trace the key developments in 
both domains since the end of the Cold War, examine how they influence the logistics-
strategy nexus, and argue that the conduct, outcome, and effectiveness of military 
operations is only fully understood if it takes both sides into account. 
The paper proceeds in three steps. It first sets out the big logistics-strategy picture by 
explaining the timeless logistics-strategy nexus. Next, it discusses the contemporary 
evolution of military logistics, international security, and strategy, and deduces how this 
has generally influenced the contemporary character of the nexus. The final section 
conducts an empirical case to illustrate the more general arguments made so far. It lays 
out the complexities of planning, supplying, and implementing contemporary 
stabilisation and counterinsurgency operations (COIN), drawing primarily on evidence 
from recent operations conducted by the United Kingdom (UK). 
The Timeless Logistics-Strategy Nexus 
To set the terms of the argument, it is necessary to first explain what is meant by the 
term military logistics. The NATO Logistics Handbook defines military logistics broadly 
as ‘the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of [air, sea, 
and land] forces’6. Jomini’s more detailed definition points out that logistics involve the 
carrying out of strategic and tactical actions, thereby consisting of ‘the means and 
arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics.7 Strategy decides where 
to act; logistics bring the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of 
                                                 
6 NATO, NATO Logistics Handbook, 3rd edition (Brussels, 1997), 1.  
7 During Jomini’s time the operational level was unknown to the military. The operational level 
existed in theory and practice but was only formally introduced in 1982 in the U.S. Army, 
Operations: FM 100-5 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army), available at 
http://www.cgsc.edu/CARL/docrepository/FM100_5_1982.pdf, accessed November 3, 2013. 
Today, we could add the operational level to Jomini’s definition of military logistics.  
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execution and the employment of the troops’.8 The crucial relationship between strategy 
and logistics is highlighted by Martin van Creveld in his seminal work Supplying War. He 
not only gives equal importance to logistics and strategy, thereby moving logistics to 
centre stage, but also reminds his reader that strategy has rested on logistics throughout 
modern history: 
Strategy, like politics, is said to be the art of the possible; but surely what is 
possible is determined not merely by numerical strengths, doctrine, intelligence, 
arms and tactics, but, in the first place, by the hardest facts of all: those 
concerning requirements, supplies available and expected, organization and 
administration, transportation and arteries of communication. Before a 
commander can even start thinking of [...] the whole rigmarole of strategy, he 
has – or ought – to make sure of his ability to supply his soldiers.9 
Put differently, military logistics decides ‘what military force can be delivered to an 
operational theatre, the time it will take to deliver that force, the scale of forces that can 
be supported once there, and the tempo of operations’10 as well as its correspondence 
with political goals.11 Logistics thus determines the variety of strategic options available, 
but not which strategic course of action will be followed or how effectively it will be 
implemented. It is this perspective that military logistics is central to a commander’s 
ability to implement his or her campaign plans that underlies the oft-cited and somewhat 
provocative adage attributed to U.S. General Omar Bradley that ‘amateurs study strategy 
and tactics. Professionals study logistics.’12 
It is imperative to note that this relationship also works in the opposite direction. 
Decision-makers are tasked with resolving a set of choices that turn strategy into a 
workable logistical system. The logistical systems in place therefore result from national 
security policy and thus the type and range of contingencies that the state chooses to 
prepare for. This is so because they affect the support requirements needed to conduct 
such operations at the desired tempo. It is here that the defence industry and civilian 
                                                 
8 Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini, The Art of War: Précis de l’ Art de Guerre, with a new Introduction 
by Charles Messenger (London: Greenhill Books, 1971; originally published in 1838), 69. 
9 Van Creveld, Supplying War, 1. 
10 Matthew Uttley and Christopher Kinsey, ‘The Role of Logistics in War,’ in The Oxford handbook 
of War, eds. Julian Lindley-French and Yves Boyer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 401. 
11 Ibid., 402. 
12 James F. Dunnigan, How to Make War (London: Harper Collins, 2003), 499.  
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supply chain, which are drawn upon to meet potential future requirements, are most 
clearly implicated, with logistics being ‘the hinge between industry and war’.13 
Taken together, grand strategic plans influence the general shape of the military logistic 
system, while future strategic options are circumscribed by the logistical system of the 
day. As the term ‘contingency’ makes clear, this process is strongly characterised by 
incomplete information and uncertainty, turning ongoing appraisals of the geo-strategic 
environment into a series of ‘what if’ scenarios. Within the confines of a specific war, 
once operations begin the entire interface – i.e. the flow of information and supplies 
from policy-makers via operational planners to battlefield commanders and back up the 
line of responsibility – takes on prime relevance as it seeks to constantly keep strategy, 
operations, tactics, and their supply in sync.14 Overall, therefore, five factors interact and 
directly affect the relationship between military logistics and strategy – policy, resources, 
information, geography, and the adversary – in which logistics determines the feasibility 
and sustainability of a given defence political strategy, while strategy circumscribes the 
shape of the logistics system. 
The Logistics-Strategy Nexus in an Evolving Military and Strategic 
Context 
The logistics-strategy nexus thus has both an enduring nature, discussed in the preceding 
section, as well as a changing character, whose contemporary iteration we turn to next. 
The current context of military change and strategic uncertainty implicates all five factors 
that were shown to circumscribe the logistics-strategy nexus. 
Military Modernisation and Strategic Uncertainty 
Over the course of several decades, the defence enterprises of many Western states not 
only modernised their weapon systems – as is well documented in the literature – but 
also gradually remodelled themselves along ideas and practices borrowed from the 
private sector with significant ramifications for military force structure. Beginning in the 
                                                 
13 Heinz Schulte, ‘Industry and War,’ in The Oxford Handbook of War, eds Julian Lindley-French 
and Yves Boyer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 517–530, at 517. 
14 Regarding information see William G. T. Tuttle, Defense Logistics for the 21st Century (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute, 2005), 6. 
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1960s, market-thought and managerialism were progressively introduced into the 
defence enterprises.15 The objective of these reforms was improving efficiency and 
effectiveness, in particular given a constant tension between the scope of foreign and 
defence political commitments and the available resources. By the 1990s, government 
executives had institutionalised ‘best business practices’ to such an extent as to engender 
a ‘corporate culture’ that asks of public servants in the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to act like business managers and that 
favours the acquisition not only of equipment but also of services from private 
companies.16 Both states also ended conscription in the 1960s and 1970s and 
significantly reduced their standing armies in the early 1990s as the result of the Peace 
Dividend. In the process, many logistics responsibilities were moved first to the reserves 
and eventually to private contractors.17 In essence, they bought into the concept of ‘core 
competency’, redefining the military from one able to be relatively self-sufficient to one 
that focuses on combat.18 For many years, the number of DoD contractors in Iraq and 
Afghanistan exceeded the number of deployed troops, underscoring the dependency on 
the private sector for both labour and supplies that are shown below to directly 
influence the conduct of war and an army’s strategic performance.19 
                                                 
15 See American Military History: the United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2003, general ed. 
Richard Stewart, Vol. II (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 
2005), 273-274, and Martin Edmonds, ‘Planning Britain's Defence, 1945–85: Capability, 
Credibility and the Problem of Time,’ in The Defence Equation: British Military Systems: Policy, 
Planning and Performance, ed. Martin Edmonds (London et al.: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986), 
1–18, at 9. 
16 Regarding the UK see Matthew Uttley, Contractors on Deployed Military Operations: United Kingdom 
Policy and Doctrine (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005), 29-30. 
Regarding the USA it should suffice here to point to the Defense Science and Defense Business 
Boards to underscore DoD’s pro-active consultation of industry views and experiences for itself.  
 For a detailed examination of this process see Mark Erbel, Contractors and Defence Policy-Making: 
Examining the Drivers, Process, and Future of Military Outsourcing, PhD Dissertation (War Studies), 
King’s College London, 2015, 95-129. 
17 See American Military History, 370-388; Stuart Croft, Andrew Dorman, Wyn Rees, and Matthew 
Uttley, Britain and Defence 1945-2000: a Policy Re-Evaluation (Harlow: Longman, 2001), 93-98; and 
Malcolm McIntosh, Managing Britain's Defence (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), 137-139. 
18 On the core competency military see Christopher Kinsey, The Transformation of War: the Rise of 
Private Contractors, The Emirates Occasional Papers 72 (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for 
Strategic Studies and Research, 2009). 
 The key policy documents were U.S. Department of Defense, Commission on Roles and 
Missions of the Armed Forces, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces 
(Arlington, VA: U.S. Department of Defense, 1995) in the USA, and UK Ministry of Defence, 
Frontline First: the Defence Costs Study (London: HM Stationery Office, 1994). 
19 Moshe Schwartz and Joyprada Swain, ‘Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. Background and Analysis’ (Congressional Research Service, No. R40764, March 2011), 
7, 10, 13, 15, 24. 
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The RML epitomises this process. The adoption of business practices accelerated in the 
1990s following the end of the Cold War.20 The RML focused on restructuring the 
military supply chain so as to resemble that of the private sector, moving from a supply-
based to a distribution-based system.21 This involved reducing large stockpiles – which 
had been hallmarks of supply-based logistics – and focusing on developing faster 
distribution mechanisms and processes. The capabilities required for this transformation 
did not exist in the military at the time but resided in civilian markets and companies,22 
leading both countries’ defence enterprises to embark on various business 
transformation initiatives and acquisition reforms.23 
The most recent RMA, similarly sought to harness technologies and products that 
existed only in the private sector. In fact, the RML is a requirement for the RMA’s 
success, as the vastly more complex and sophisticated weapon systems demanded 
significantly more and enhanced support and maintenance service capabilities.24 The 
number of private sector personnel needed to install products, train the military in their 
use, and maintain them thus rapidly grew for the new systems, processes, and platforms 
introduced in the context of the RML and RMA. Crucially, as intellectual property rights 
and technical data usually remain with the manufacturer,25 the military is not allowed (or 
possibly even able) to change or adapt the equipment without the permission (and often 
the assistance) of the manufacturer, even when the equipment is operational. The 
military therefore now increasingly taps into existing civilian technologies, products, 
supply chains, transport capacities, and workforces and relies on support service 
contractors not only in home bases but also in active theatres of war. What is more, the 
                                                 
20 Cf. P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: the Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, upd edn (Ithaca, NY; 
London: Cornell University Press, 2008), 66-67, and Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: the 
Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 34-38. 
21 See U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Business Board, Supply Chain / Performance-Based 
Logistics Task Group: Report to the Senior Executive Council, Department of Defense, Report FY03-4 
(Washington, D.C., 2003). In a nutshell, supply-based systems work off of existing stockpiles 
while distribution-based systems focus on the process of rapidly supplying a customer with 
minimal turnaround times at the stages an item passes through. 
22 See U.S. Department of the Army, Army Science and Technology Master Plan (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of the Army, 1998), accessed March 9, 2012, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/army/docs/astmp98/index.html, Annex G, Section B. 
23 See e.g. UK Ministry of Defence, Defence Equipment & Support, DE&S Business Plan 2010-
2013 (Abbey Wood: UK Ministry of Defence, n.d.), 2, UK Ministry of Defence, Policy Paper No. 
4: Defence Acquisition (London: UK Ministry of Defence, 2001), and Kevin Carroll and Colonel 
David W. Coker, ‘Logistics Modernization Program: a Cornerstone of Army Transformation,’ in 
Army Logistician 39, no. 1 (January-February 2007), 11–15. 
24 Reimer, ‘Revolution in Military Logistics’. 
25 Interview with Dr Frank Camm, Senior Economist, RAND Corporation, April 2012. 
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portfolio of systems and platforms ‘owned’ (and sometimes operated) by the military in 
the traditional sense has steeply declined as in-house knowledge and responsibilities 
were transferred out of the military into the private sector. The former Director for 
Logistics (J4) at the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, LTG (ret) C.V. Christianson, a thought 
leader in the field concludes accordingly that today ‘industry is an important player – 
maybe the most critical element of all – to defence supply chain success; for it is within 
industry that we ultimately find the ‘source’ of our logistics support.’26 Contractor-
centred and often decades-long product support arrangements, such as performance-
based logistics, contractor logistics support, and ‘through-life capability management’, 
have become the preferred or even standard choices in the US and UK defence 
acquisition systems.27 
The strategic environment, meanwhile, evolved at the same time that military logistics 
was transformed. During the Cold War, the threat perceived by the West was well 
known. Soviet intentions and their ability to turn them into capability guided Western 
defence policy.28 Following the end of the Cold War and its geopolitical shifts, Western 
states incrementally adopted a more interventionist posture. Often ill-defined limited 
risks are perceived on a global scale. On an international strategic level, addressing risks 
now takes on a pre-emptive and possibly even preventive form as inaction is often 
regarded as riskier than going to war. Concepts such as ‘preventive defence’ proliferated 
as the West turned its attention away from adversarial strong states to risks emanating 
from so-called ‘failed’, ‘failing’, or ‘fragile’ states.29 The resulting type of military 
operations thus rely not only on global power projection capabilities at short notice, but 
also often take the shape of ‘wars among the people’ that rely heavily on support rather 
than combat capabilities.30 Moreover, such contemporary wars, unlike existential wars in 
                                                 
26 C.V. Christianson, ‘Global Dispersion, Global Sustainment: a Mandate for a Global Logistics 
Organization?’ Joint Force Quarterly, no. 65 (April 2012), 44–47, at 45. 
27 See U.S. Congress, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, H.R. 4310, 2013, 
Section 823, and UK MoD, DE&S Business Plan 2010-2013, 2. In through-life models the 
manufacturer is responsible not only for delivering a capability (e.g. an unmanned aerial vehicle) 
but also for maintaining, repairing, upgrading, and sometimes operating it – the military 
purchases an asset’s capability rather than the asset itself. 
28 Robert Johnson, Improbable Dangers (New York, NY: St Martin’s Press, 1994), 2.  
29 Christopher Coker, Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-First Century: NATO and the 
Management of Risk, Adelphi Paper, Vol. 345 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 54, 59-64. 
The government publication most clearly epitomising this shift was U.S. White House, The 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2002). 
30 Gary H. Mears and Ted Kim, ‘Logistics: the Way Ahead,’ Joint Force Quarterly, no. 4 (May 1994): 
38-44, at 40, 42. 
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the past, are generally fought not by alliances but coalitions, with potential implications 
for their supply as discussed below. 
The Impact of Military Modernisation and Strategic Uncertainty on 
the Contemporary Character of the Logistics-Strategy Nexus 
The developments in the defence enterprise outlined above complicate the interplay 
between logistics and strategy. First, the move to distribution-based logistics reduced not 
only turnaround times but also the stocks available at a decreasing number of 
government-owned storage facilities, increased the types of actors involved in supplying 
war, and introduced additional, less visible or controllable layers into the supply chain. 
Military planners must now plan around an increasingly private supply chain and consult 
with suppliers at the very early planning stages of even low-scale operations to ensure 
the availability and sustainability of systems, spares, and munitions. On the one hand, 
this potentially increases operational security concerns to extend beyond government 
officials who are excluded on a need-to-know basis to encompass support service 
contractors who provide the bulk of military support to the armed forces on overseas 
deployments. This situation stands in sharp contrast to what Thomas Kane found, 
namely that ‘[to] provide the resources which strategy requires, logisticians must 
participate in the making of strategy, not only in the planning phase of a campaign, but 
every step of the way’.31 Given the breadth and pervasiveness of contractorisation, this 
statement may need to be amended to also include support service contractors. Senior 
logisticians will however tell you that they do not have the logistical input that 
operational theory would require them to have32 in today’s environment, which requires 
constant reinterpretation, while politicians themselves also tend to disregard logistics.33 A 
potential result is the delay or shortfall of the provision of mission-critical services and 
equipment. 
                                                 
31 Kane, Military Logistics and Strategic Performance, 5. 
32 In a personal interview with the author in February 2012, retired Major General Jeff Mason, 
former Assistant Chief of Defence Staff for Logistics (ACDS (Log Ops)), for instance recounted 
how he repeatedly invited himself to meetings to ensure that the logistics aspects are taken into 
account on the strategic level. 
33 See e.g. Matt Cavanagh, ‘Ministerial Decision-Making in the Run-Up to the Helmand 
Deployment,’ The RUSI Journal 157, no. 2 (April-May 2012): 48-54, at 51-52. 
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On the other hand, the shift to a core competency military, the complexity of 
technological systems, the knowledge transfer out of the military, and the subsequent 
far-reaching contractorisation of large parts of the logistics tail means that numerous 
integral actors are located on virtually all layers of the supply chain. This increases the 
complexity of the system and reduces its palpability as a whole. The flow of information 
between those involved in planning and executing military strategies is affected by the 
loss of clarity regarding the channels of communication, the development of parallel 
chains of command, and the blurring of existing ones.34 Also, the end-users – forward 
soldiers and officers – sit at the end of a potentially long, lowly-stocked, and volatile 
supply chain.35 The military has thus not only lost its sense of ownership over its supply 
chains; its suppliers and service providers face risks which are outside the control and 
often hidden from view of the military end-user.36  
Secondly, the strategic shifts above also immediately relate to military logistics and 
logistics transformation by affecting the parameters of required logistics capabilities. A 
global posture aimed at uncertainties and the rapid onset of military operations in any 
corner of the globe stands and falls with responsiveness. Logistically, the future supply 
of armed forces will operate on awareness, networks, mobility, and sustainability of 
global scope, and through a logistic enterprise that moves ‘from mass toward 
responsiveness’37 – essentially the objective of the RML. Strategically, responsiveness 
denotes the ability of the armed forces to establish and credibly project force when, 
where, and how it may be required by the military commander. Former U.S. Army Chief 
of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, asserted that after the Cold War the need is no longer for 
                                                 
34 On additional chains of command, see Lexington Institute, Contractors on the Battlefield: a Support 
Force to Manage (Arlington, VA: Lexington Institute, 2007), 10. 
 For the more specific impact of the introduction of contractors into the Total Force on civil-
military relations see Thomas C. Bruneau, Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. 
National Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), and Meghan O’Keefe, ‘Civil-
Private Military Relations: The Impacts of Military Outsourcing on State Capacity and the 
Control of Force,’ Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre 
Sheraton Montreal Hotel, Montréal, Québec, 16 March 2011, available at 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p500011_index.html. 
35 Col. Sharon L. Leary, Sustaining the Long War, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
U.S. Army War College, 2007), 8. 
36 For a concise discussion of the outsourcing of military logistics, see Mark Erbel and 
Christopher Kinsey, ‘Privatizing Military Logistics,’ in Routledge Handbook of Private Security Studies, 
eds. Rita Abrahamsen and Anna Leander (Abingdon: Routledge, forthcoming in 2015). 
37 Lt Gen. (ret) C.V. Christianson, ‘National Security and Global Logistics: Adapting to the 
Uncertainties of Tomorrow,’ Army Sustainment 44, no. 6 (November-December 2012): 4-7, at 6-7. 
See also Leary, 1. 
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forward-stationed heavy divisions that are powerful but difficult to deploy, but for 
quickly deployable, lethal, and survivable forces across the spectrum. Within his 
transformation strategy, sustainability was regarded as the key enabler for the Army, and 
strategic responsiveness itself was tightly wound up in the aforementioned RML.38 In 
other words, the very basis of the military’s ability to realise its post-Cold War grand 
strategy and posture is logistics. What is more, the supply and support of such a global 
presence brings with it a very long logistical ‘tail’ which is credited with dramatically 
increasing the tail-to-tooth ratio, i.e. the number of soldiers engaged in support rather 
than combat functions.39 Therefore, not only is logistics the basis of implementing 
strategy, but the demands placed on the logistics systems have heightened further since 
the end of the Cold War, are increasingly implemented by private contractors operating 
outside the regular military force structure and chain of command, and face the technical 
challenges discussed above. Moreover, given that wars today are generally fought by 
coalitions of the willing, there emerges the risk that supply systems of coalition partners 
are much less integrated than those of long-time allies. Since these wars often take the 
shape of ‘wars among the people’, the logistic system for a given operation will have to 
operate in ill-defined battlespaces, further complicating the supply of force in the 
absence of clearly identifiable safe areas, lines of communications, and front lines, as we 
explore in the next section. 
In summary, both military logistics and defence strategy underwent significant 
developments in the post-Cold War era. Viewed in isolation they are evolutionary and 
fairly straightforward to grasp; their combination, meanwhile, significantly affects the 
contemporary character of the logistics-strategy nexus and the contemporary reciprocal 
relationship between the two. Following the more general and conceptual discussion 
about the nexus and its contemporary shape above, this paper now offers more detailed 
empirical evidence to illustrate the conceptual argument and provide deeper support for 
our claims regarding contemporary strategy, uncertainty, military logistics, and supplying 
contemporary war. 
                                                 
38 Col. David B. Gaffney, Army Logistics Transformation: a Key Component of Military Strategic 
Responsiveness, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008), at 
7, 9, and 12. 
39 Daniel R. Lake, ‘Technology, Qualitative Superiority, and the Overstretched American 
Military,’ Strategic Studies Quarterly 77 (Winter 2012): 71-99, at 83. 
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The Contemporary Logistics-Strategy Nexus in Action: 
Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
The general observations and contentions discussed above become particularly visible 
and acute in asymmetric conflicts such as counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in post-
invasion Iraq and Afghanistan. However, given that the issues observed and discussed 
below are at least latently present in most armed conflicts, the following case studies are 
relevant to a better understanding not only of past operations but also future conflicts. It 
is therefore all the more telling that the sizeable body of literature on warfare in general 
and COIN in particular that emerged in the past decade all but bypasses logistics. The 
remainder of this article addresses this oversight by explicating the reciprocally shaping 
and constraining dynamics and relationship between military logistics on the one hand, 
and strategic opportunity and performance on the other with reference to UK 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It sets out both the wider strategic as well as 
operational pictures, and analyses how the latter constrained commanders when the two 
pictures did not align. It then closes by synthesising its findings and tying them back into 
the conceptual discussion above, in particular by highlighting the reciprocal and 
sequential relationship and influence between the five factors that affect the logistics-
strategy nexus and indeed military operations in any given context: policy, resources, 
information, geography, and the adversary. 
How Strategies Shaped Logistics Footprints 
Not dissimilar to the expectations of their US allies, perhaps the defining characteristic 
of the UK’s part in the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent occupation of the south of 
the country in 2003 was the assumption that victory would be achieved swiftly,40 that 
British troops would be welcomed, and that the entire operation would soon be over. 
The scope of the expected battles was small, and the aversion to casualties was high 
among the political leadership, which created a situation in which the political visibility 
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of tactical issues and thus the desire to drive military strategy were high among political 
decision-makers.41 Intelligence preparations thus did not reach far beyond the initial 
battle – assumed to be small and swift – with the assumption being to remain in place 
until it was possible to withdraw.42  
The UK deployment to Helmand in 2006, meanwhile, was similarly designed to be a 
safe, manageable, and relatively static operation across the province.43 According to 
retired Colonel David Wiggins, who was on the planning staff for the British 
deployment to Helmand as operational planner for the Defence Logistics Organisation, 
‘the planning assumption brief was that much of the force would be tied to static 
locations, and that the only manoeuvre element would consist of a combined force of 
about 250 men which would be used on two or three operations a month’.44 As the first 
tactical commander on the ground, Brigadier General Ed Butler testified to the 
parliamentary defence committee, the UK troops were designed to be able to mount 
‘one deliberate operation and three or four reactive ones a month.’45 There was thus an 
overall tendency, in the words of the former ISAF commander Lord Richards, not to 
abide by the Army’s credo to ‘hope for the best but plan for the worst.’ Instead, the 
army was ‘actually hoping for the best and planning for the best.’ He also observed an 
‘institutional reluctance’ to acknowledge the possibility of the conflict getting worse.46 
Former Chief of the General Staff General Sir Peter Wall is accordingly quoted 
acknowledging that the assumption that the Army would be reducing to about 1,000 
troops in Iraq by late 2005, i.e. the time when the Helmand deployment was to begin, 
was no longer realistic.47 However, there were no consequences for the decision to take 
on two full-scale operations.48 Finally, therefore, and very probably because of the heavy 
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commitment in two theatres of operations, the amount of resources – manpower, 
equipment, and support – circumscribed the limits of what was possible to deploy.49 
This combination of factors left strong imprints on the initial deployments, force 
structures, and military footprints, as well as the military’s ability to react to changing 
dynamics on the ground. In Basra, the UK military assumed a defensive posture with a 
soft tactical footprint and spread out across several bases as it had done in the past in the 
Balkans and Northern Ireland.50 Encouraged by low levels of violence – especially in 
comparison to the US-controlled areas – and intending to hand over security 
responsibility quickly to Iraqi forces, it was expected ‘that Basra could be held by a single 
battalion using soft-skinned vehicles and wearing berets’, and troop levels were quickly 
reduced from an initial 42,000 to 9,000.51  
In Helmand, meanwhile, UK forces deployed in 2006 with large ambitions for pacifying 
and positively impacting the province through reconstruction and security. Initially, 
3,000 UK troops were to be based in four locations – Kandahar Air Base, Camp Bastion 
(northwest of Lashkar Gah), Lashkar Gah, and Forward Operating Base (FOB) Price (in 
Nahri Saraj District). The supply of these bases was to be done via short land-based lines 
of communication.52 Similarly, troops were intended to manoeuvre in vehicles and the 
limited numbers of anticipated engagements were expected to be force-on-force rather 
than road-side bombs. The number of Chinook helicopters was based on these plans.53 
Logistic resupply sorties between the four bases or sorties in support of offensive 
operations by the battlegroup may however not have featured sufficiently in these plans; 
rather, the number of deployed support helicopters was the number available.54 The 
logistic footprint may thus have been based not only on strategic assessments and needs, 
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but also simply on the manpower and kit that remained available after combat assets had 
been nominated.55 
Thus originated the UK military footprints in Iraq and Afghanistan in the early phases 
of the deployments. The operations on the ground, however, did not align very neatly 
with those that had been planned for, forcing civilian and military decision-makers to 
respond by adapting their strategies and the capability mix of troops and equipment. In 
doing so, they were severely constrained by the original logistic and manpower package 
already in place, which impacted on the further course of operations as we discuss next. 
How Logistics Footprints Constrained Operational Choices and 
Opportunities 
As is very well documented, Iraq’s south did not remain peaceful for long. In Basra and 
the surrounding rural areas, major fire fights broke out on most patrols, while bases 
were increasingly coming under attack and siege by militias. The recently scaled-back 
UK contingent, facing corrupt local police and being supported by only few newly 
trained Iraqi soldiers (most were deployed north where the violence was even worse), 
was caught off guard by the sudden eruption of violence which took on the form of a 
full-scale insurgency.56 As a result, as many patrols as possible changed from soft-
skinned vehicles and wearing berets to the available armoured vehicles and personal 
protective equipment (PPE) to protect against road-side bombs and rocket fire. Without 
reinforcements being sent to Basra, the deployment however quickly ran into trouble on 
two related fronts: the ability and political will to continue patrols, as well as the ability to 
supply and operate from the several established bases in and around Basra.57 The lack of 
sufficient protective kit and protective mobility against the unexpected threat of 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), coupled with risk aversion meant that patrols 
could not be undertaken safely and were thus reduced to a minimum. Moreover, 
without patrols the military were not able to take the initiative as much as it would have 
had to in order to turn the tide on the militias. At the same time, the spread out bases in 
and around Basra had to be supplied by logistics patrols, but with the unsustainable 
footprint – leading to improvisation such as locally producing some form of armour 
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plates for soft-skinned vehicles for at least some protection – the supply runs could not 
be kept up.58 Politically remaining intent on withdrawing from Iraq and handing over to 
local forces, the UK amended the operational design to match the realities on the 
ground not by surging troop numbers and consolidating gains made against the militias 
but by withdrawing – over the course of about a year – from the outer bases and 
concentrating on the base at Basra airfield. Mobility, and the ability to conduct deliberate 
operations and take the initiative were heavily reduced.59 Basra fell from the UK military 
to the Jaish al-Mahdi and was only brought back under Iraqi government control after a 
major US/Iraqi operation was launched in 2008.60 
The situation in Helmand, especially in its early stages, shares a number of similarities 
with that in Basra. Light military forces were deployed across four bases using an 
‘inkspot strategy’ to clear and hold territory and expand from there, while sustainment 
was to be assured via road. Soon after arriving in 2006, the Taliban launched a wave of 
attacks against British and the local Helmand governorate’s positions. Fearing a collapse 
of the local government, Brigadier Ed Butler, the first tactical commander on the 
ground in Helmand, directed small groups of his combat troops to deploy across the 
province and secure main government buildings in Sangin, Nawzad, Musa Qaleh, and 
Kajaki.61 The concomitant expansion of bases by four – FOB Robinson, platoon houses 
in Musa Qaleh, Sangin, and Garmsir – which resulted from abandoning the initial 
‘inkspot strategy’, did not fully account for the logistic implications of stretching the 
forces thin across a wide geographical area,62 possibly because of the time-sensitive 
nature of the expansion. Logistically, the spread across Helmand meant considerably 
more and longer supply lines whose operation required significant resources and which 
were moreover vulnerable to attack on land; they therefore became increasingly 
dependent on the low number of deployed helicopters. By stretching resources thin, the 
force’s capacity to take the initiative and conduct deliberate operations shrank.63 Some 
operations had to be delayed or required help from the US military to be conducted. In 
one instance, the only two available Chinook helicopters had to be used for an 
emergency resupply mission to FOB Robinson which was running low on food and 
                                                 
58 David Shouesmith, March 2015. 
59 Elliott, High Command, 114-117, and David Shouesmith, March 2015. 
60 Elliott, High Command, 120-121. 
61 Ibid, 134. 
62 Andy Curtis, March 2015. 
63 Ibid. 
 17 
water, meaning that a 3 PARA company could not deploy on a major operation with the 
US’s 10th Mountain Division in Northern Helmand as planned, leading to a delay of the 
entire operation by a day.64 Overall, the resources expended on supplying the larger web 
of bases reduced the ability to adapt to changing dynamics on the ground. This was only 
resolved when the deployed UK force tripled to just under 10,000 uniformed soldiers 
and officers who were supported by a further approximately 9,000 contractors and 
supplied with additional protective kit and mobility (vehicles and helicopters).65 
Brigadier Butler, who was aware before the deployment had even begun ‘that there were 
significant shortfalls in core equipment areas’ and enabling capabilities,66 had been wary 
of spreading his small force thin across the province, and his fears were vindicated when 
‘large forces, comprising hundreds of insurgents [were able] to surround and potentially 
isolate these British outposts’67 and take them under heavy, sustained attack. UK forces 
– under-resourced with Weapons Mount Installation Kit Land Rovers (WMIKs) for 
combat support and combat service support, and struggling with equipment that had 
been procured for Iraq but that did not work in the Afghan dust and on non-asphalted 
roads –68 had to withdraw from Musa Qaleh, which became ‘a haven for insurgents’ 
until no less than 4,000 British, Afghan, and US troops assaulted the town in December 
2007.69 The need for this particular operation came directly from a mismatch between 
the strategy of expanding across the province and its sustainability with the support 
package in place. Moreover, the operation also diverted attention and resources away 
from two overarching strategic objectives in Helmand – development and 
reconstruction.  
Thus, while in isolation each of the logistic factors analysed here may be of secondary 
importance, it is their combined effect on the ability to conduct operations to the best 
possible strategic and operational effect, as happened in Musa Qaleh, which makes its 
centrality to strategy clear. The move towards COIN in Helmand, but also the fighting 
of militias in Basra, encountered the usual problems associated with COIN. It requires a 
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large pool of manpower, faces challenges associated with high training needs of both 
own and host nation troops, and requires the generating of capability across a wide area 
with partly underdeveloped infrastructure, all of which reduce readiness elsewhere.70 As 
a result of the various shortages, the initiative was lost to insurgent forces, and thus the 
flexibility to amend strategy in response to events on the ground. 
Converging and Intervening Factors Affecting the Logistics-
Strategy Nexus 
While the responses to the problems described above were logical, ranging from the 
inkspot strategy and COIN, to a surge in troop numbers and an increase in available 
equipment, these actions were inhibited by precisely those factors that circumscribe the 
operation of the logistics-strategy nexus as discussed earlier. The five factors of policy, 
resources, information, geography, and the adversary can here be synthesised into two 
clusters that directly recall the earlier discussion of the importance and effects of military 
modernisation and strategic uncertainty; first, the complex battle space and area of 
operations, and second, time lags and volatilities in the supply chain. 
First, the battle space and area of operations in Afghanistan in particular, but also in 
Iraq, displayed a series of interrelated social, geographic, economic, and infrastructural 
complexities that strategists and politicians did not have to contend with as much when 
preparing for war along the Central Front during the Cold War. Taking these factors in 
turn, socially the battle space is complex because these ‘spectator sport wars’, as 
McInnes calls them, aim at the ‘hearts and minds’ of ethnically and religiously diverse 
populations. For better or worse, these are stereotypically defined by primordial 
markers.71 Intelligence and a sophisticated appreciation of the local, societal situation – 
information – thus becomes of prime relevance. This was clearly illustrated in the invasion 
and occupation of Iraq in 2003. Politicised intelligence and trust in untrustworthy 
sources, groupthink, a lack of understanding of the country amongst political leaders, as 
well as a political desire for a small military footprint – policy – led to the catastrophic 
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understaffing of the U.S.-led campaign,72 and to a shortage of protective kit among UK 
troops as discussed above. These factors heavily contributed to shortages – resources – 
that created security vacuums that facilitated the breakdown of order along both ethnic 
and sectarian lines. In Helmand, similarly, the UK ‘did not have any clear intelligence 
picture … it was an empty hole’, as the Chief of Defence Staff at the time, General Sir 
Michael Walker, stated in an interview in 2013.73 The deployment itself as well as the 
establishment of additional bases across Helmand province ran up against the ‘hearts 
and minds’ objective. For one, the targeted opium fields were the main source of 
income for large parts of the population, so that their destruction without always 
providing a viable alternative had an immediate, negative economic impact on the very 
people that the hearts and minds campaign was supposed to win over. Also,  these bases 
became natural targets for attacks by Taliban-linked fighters that often caused heavy 
destruction and loss of life among the civilian population. This throws into doubt the 
benefits of aligning themselves with foreign troops and their objectives.74 The 
aforementioned ill-defined nature of the battle space and its deeply social characteristic is 
thrown into full relief here insofar as combat occurs with little warning, if any, and 
(often deliberately) in built-up areas, while directly affecting and quite often targeting, in 
both political and military terms, the local civilian population. 
Geographically, the battle space is ill-defined because, rather than cover a subset of a 
territory, it extends to virtually the entire area of operations and becomes intermittently 
active or inactive. Furthermore, in many cases the battle space is very far ‘out of area’, 
which creates its own set of challenges with strategic access and lines of communication. 
Logistic activities themselves can become highly political, both domestically and 
internationally. Internationally, unlike the Central Front during the Cold War, strategic 
access to theatres of war ‘out of area’ can be highly volatile. As Christianson puts it, 
‘[gone] are the days when we had the time and resources to position large stores of 
assets in response to a stable, predictable threat.’75 The refusal of Turkey to allow the 
USA to use military bases for the war in Iraq in 2003 (while nonetheless opening their 
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airspace) – international policy – is one pertinent example among many;76 the repeated 
closures of the supply lines from Pakistan into Afghanistan, most recently for seven 
months in protest at a USA air attack on the Salala check point in November 2011, are 
another.77 Almost two years later the US military was still clearing stockpiles that had 
been stored in Karachi during the closure and that had not reached the troops during 
what was the end of the surge and thus a strategically critical moment of the decade-long 
Afghan war.78 The UK, meanwhile, had built stockpiles in anticipation of a fragile line of 
communication from Pakistan into Afghanistan. Had these closures however occurred 
early on in the operation, before the stockpiles had been built, this would have posed 
serious challenges.79 Moreover, such closures not only place additional burdens on lines 
of communication and undermined the noted centrality of responsiveness for such 
interventions. Stockholdings also go against the aforementioned change towards 
distribution-based logistics. The increased footprint led to additional costs for storage 
and stock turnover, and additionally significantly complicated redeployments by creating 
a significantly enhanced management and transport burden.80 The ability to supply 
troops thus was closely woven into the international relations with regional powers. The 
fact that this did not lead to outright defeat does not negative the fact this issue does not 
represent a significant challenge to the logistics-strategy nexus, especially when it 
operates in complex, out-of-area operational theatres. In Afghanistan this was at least 
partly alleviated by the fact that the land lines of communication were operated by local 
contractors; Pakistan would not have allowed US or UK troops in uniform to move 
supplies through Pakistan. The use of local contractors also ensured that the local 
economy profited to some extent by creating business opportunities, and benefited from 
local knowledge.81  
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Infrastructurally, Afghanistan, in particular, represented challenges because of the either 
underdeveloped or heavily damaged road, rail, and air networks that traversed the ill-
defined battle space and connected the hundreds of bases COIN operations relied on. 
On the technical side, the Afghan theatre placed big strains on kit, which did not work 
properly in the dust and on non-asphalted roads in Helmand. For example, Mastiffs, 
which were bought in large numbers for Iraq, were too large for some roads. Warrior 
vehicles required additional armour given the unconventional methods of warfare being 
used in the country. All of these challenges required modifications and enhanced 
logistics and support packages to be put in place, which in turn increased the logistic 
footprint at the expense of combat troops, and ran up against politically set troop caps 
which we discuss below.82 More directly implicating operations, military bases and 
military-linked installations in Afghanistan were estimated to have reached 
approximately 1,500 in 2012.83 The result of such a footprint is the replication of the 
aforementioned dynamic regarding how global postures necessitate massive global 
supply chains: it creates long in-country ‘tail ends’. In our cases, these were shown to be 
highly vulnerable to attack, prone to overstretching military personnel on the ground, 
and risking the alienation of the civilian population when it becomes exposed to 
violence when it ties its economic wellbeing to cooperating with or supplying foreign 
troops, as the next paragraph explains. 
Economically, finally, the battle space can become particularly complex because the 
stabilisation component makes swift economic development a key marker of success. In 
‘new wars’, however, warfare and the continuation of hostilities become objectives in 
and of themselves for some of the adversaries. This creates a shadow market that 
directly competes with the attainment of stabilisation objectives. For example, local 
sourcing in Afghanistan was complicated because Taliban-linked groups often targeted 
local businesses that supplied foreign troops. This immediately attacked the objective of 
encouraging domestic economic growth by hiring local suppliers and workers for the 
supply of troops and the ongoing (re)construction efforts. It potentially forced the 
victims to cease cooperating with foreign troops or even to side with the insurgency. 
The local economy thus becomes a key battleground, where tying local producers into 
one’s own fold acquires strategic importance. Economic objectives thus not only clash 
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regarding the ceasing of hostilities more narrowly, but also regarding the broader sense 
of victory when swift economic development becomes a key marker thereof.  
Moreover, running and coordinating combat, stabilisation, and reconstruction 
operations in parallel is highly challenging and is made even more complex by the 
outsourcing of much of the non-combat effort. Substantive parts of reconstruction 
funds in Afghanistan were found to have been paid, usually by various contracted 
workforces, to Taliban-linked groups for the protection of transports and of the very 
development projects intended to undermine the Taliban’s appeal.84 The realisation of 
some stabilisation and reconstruction projects thereby inadvertently undermined the 
stabilisation and counterinsurgency effort. This can at least in part be attributed to the 
difficulties in overseeing a supply chain and a web of implementing actors on the ground 
that is defined by the low visibility of various layers of contractors and subcontractors 
who are not controlled in the same way a military supply chain would be. Thus, holding 
a key role in the reconstruction of the ‘regular’ economy, the logistics of such operations 
acquires strategic importance, while the potential funding of the shadow ‘war economy’ 
risks offsetting its contribution. 
Secondly, a series of factors leads to time lags, delays, and volatilities in the supply of war 
that directly affects the ability to implement a strategy. There are several causes of such 
time lags and delays. They are located within the political, budgetary, and industrial 
spheres (i.e. policy and resources), and compounded by a crucial intervening factor making 
the supply of war within the existing parameters even more challenging – an adaptive 
adversary. On an operational-strategic level, there was a frequent turnover of tactical 
commanders in Helmand, many of whom developed new plans to pacify the province.85 
By the time new equipment for these particular plans arrived, a new tactical commander 
was usually in place, while the assets inherited from the previous commander’s plans 
often did not fit into their own plans for the province.86 More coordination and 
continuity of such supply efforts on the strategic levels could clearly have alleviated 
some of the resulting pressures. Additionally, operational security concerns also led to 
                                                 
84 See U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Warlord Inc.: Extortion and Corruption 
along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: Congress of the United States, 2010), 
2 and passim, and Mark Mazzetti, Scott Shane, and Alissa J. Rubin, ‘A Brutal Afghan Clan 
Bedevils the U.S.,’ New York Times (25 September 2011), A1. 
85 Elliott, High Command, 131. 
86 David Shouesmith, March 2015. 
 23 
delays on the operational-strategic level. In Iraq, for example, implicating the widespread 
contractorisation of military responsibilities, some logistics problems occurred because 
the security clearances required to participate in the planning for the invasion of Iraq in 
2003 exceeded those held by the U.S. Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program’s 
(LOGCAP) contractors in the planning section. LOGCAP contractors then had little 
time to meet the requirements that had been set by the military.87 The situation in the 
UK with Contractor Logistics (CONLOG) is very similar. According to retired Major 
General Jeff Mason, former Assistant Chief of Defence Staff for Logistics (ACDS 
(LogOps)), the principle is ‘that when PJHQ [Permanent Joint Headquarters] is planning 
they should include those embedded contractors – currently from KBR – in the 
planning process: I am not sure that this has happened recently, and that there is still a 
boundary that comes down so that contractors are not involved in the planning.’88 As a 
result, there can occur avoidable time pressures and forces may face a potentially a lack 
of equipment in the early phases of an operation. In the case of Operation TELIC in 
Afghanistan, for example, the House of Commons found that ‘the need to maintain 
operational security and the speed of deployment prevented the [UK MoD] from 
engaging with industry early enough to allow all the required supplies to be delivered on 
time’.89 
More complicated still, the interplay between industry, politics, and defence budgets is 
prone to delay modifications and new support deliveries. As noted above, one result of 
‘[cashing] in on the peace dividend’ and of modernising military supply chains was the 
reduction of stocks to the lowest possible levels, leaving the military to ‘[conduct] 
operations at the end of a very fragile, long line of communication with reduced 
inventories’.90 The end-user thus sits at the end of a long, increasingly privatised supply 
chain that comprises numerous vulnerabilities that begin at the home base and extend 
thousands of miles away down to the smallest outpost in rural Afghanistan. As Wiggins 
explains, there is a drag-coefficient between the pace of an operation and the ability of 
industry to meet changing requirements.91 Operational and logistical planners thus 
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continuously had to respond to shortages and rely on industry’s ability to deliver adapted 
products and services on short notice, as the military is increasingly unable to produce 
goods and services from in-house sources due to understaffing and knowledge transfer 
out of the army. Within just a few years, for instance, the British Army had lost the in-
house knowledge to build temporary deployable accommodation, with one witness 
observing that ‘[the] Royal Engineers working on Camp Bastion had never built’ such 
accommodation before.92 This state of affairs fully incorporates our previous finding 
that integral actors are now located on virtually all layers of the military supply chain. 
Together with the high maintenance and modification requirements, this led to the 
creation of in-theatre equipment and support capability, which is generally delivered by 
contractors. Nonetheless, a lot of this provision takes time. For instance, to tackle the 
shortage of Chinook helicopters the rotary wing hours were increased from 250 to 400 
hours per month, but this process took twelve to eighteen months of working closely 
with industry.93 
Additional delays to the noted time it takes providers to supply modifications and new 
kit result from the political and budgetary processes. The UK contingent in Afghanistan 
was capped as a matter of politics, eventually at about 10,000 uniformed troops. Plans to 
send additional equipment into theatre then quickly run up against such caps because 
additional kit means additional support troops on the ground. In the early phases of the 
Helmand deployment, Mason recounts situations such as deploying ‘an extra four 
helicopters, that is probably an extra 100, 150 people, which you then have to balance 
because politicians will say ‘what are you going to take out to keep the force at 3,600?’’94 
Part of the answer lay in outsourcing as much as possible of the logistical ‘tail end’ of the 
operation, which meant that the UK effectively ran an operation with 10,000 troops that 
would usually have required about double the numbers of soldiers. Yet even with 
outsourcing, the funding mechanism of contingency operations – which are paid for by 
the Treasury rather than the MoD – and the variability of the adversary represent two 
additional complexities for supplying war and implementing a strategy. Wiggins offered 
an anecdote about the Mastiff vehicle that is worth quoting at length here as illustrative 
of this: 
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Mastiffs were procured with a limited, twelve-month support package in line 
with Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) policy at the time. The overall 
spend outstripped the available funding for all of the UORs needed at that point 
in the campaign and therefore we were put under pressure to prioritize the 
purchases of spares. As the Taliban were concentrating their attacks on the front 
axle assemblies, these were procured as a high priority at the expense of other 
spares. Unfortunately, as is his habit, the enemy then changed the point of attack 
on the platform, to other areas of the vehicle. This in turn meant that we were 
sitting on a sizeable supply of front axles but were challenged to conduct repairs 
on other parts for which we lacked the correct spares. We were thus forced to 
go back to the Treasury and request further funding for the new spares and 
manage a further delay as industry was unable initially to provide the quantities 
required to cope with the immediate surge in demand.95 
In summary, therefore, as we argued at the outset, policy, resources, information, 
geography, and the adversary interact in the logistics-strategy nexus by shaping the 
logistics system in place as well as circumscribing that system’s ability to make possible 
the implementation and sustainment of a given strategy. 
Conclusion 
The main argument of this article is that logistics constrains strategic opportunity, while 
at the same time it is itself heavily circumscribed by strategic and operational planning. 
Importantly, this relationship is deeply reciprocal and dynamic over time. Therefore, the 
study and conduct of war and strategy must account for logistics as it ‘is not merely a 
precondition to military operations [but] an integral component of the art of war’96 
without which analyses of war are incomplete at best or false at worst. At the same time, 
the literature on the wars fought since the end of the Cold War, including the sizeable 
body of literature on COIN and recent wars that emerged in the past decade, all but 
bypasses logistics with only few exceptions.97 This article therefore set out to argue for a 
reappraisal of the critical role of logistics and indeed its centrality to war and strategy. It 
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did so by conceptualising the logistics-strategy nexus and then empirically illustrating its 
operation in UK military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001.  
These operations are important in that the outcome in each case cannot be fully 
comprehended without also accounting for the impact logistics had on them. Both 
operations make a very strong case for why it is so important to fully incorporate 
logistics at every stage of geo-strategic, operational, and tactical analysis. As the evidence 
showed, this does not always happen in practice. Instead, geo-strategic and operational 
decisions were made with insufficient consideration of their relationship with the 
logistics systems responsible for generating the means for their implementation. As the 
outcome of both operations clearly showed, marginalising logistics is to neglect 
important parts of the political, strategic, and economic realities associated with war. 
Both the wider literature as well as the COIN-specific literature therefore require a 
reappraisal. Often, the main focus of such studies is on the weaknesses of a strategy, 
such as the lack of political will to stay the course or the lack of troop numbers. Instead, 
larger questions require addressing. Some may broach the difficulties of streamlining 
acquisition, improving the use of contractors, or conducting deeper anthropological 
study. Others may see the complexities discussed in this paper and the consequences 
that may arise out of their underestimation to revisit the utility of force and to question 
the maintenance of a mismatch between ends, ways, and means. In all of these, military 
logistics is about more than just Napoleon’s dictum than ‘an army marches on its 
stomach.’ It is a central factor that determines the occurrence, conduct, and outcome of 
war – on and far beyond the battlefield. 
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